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to home was Pearl Harbor and at the time, that was 
a colonial outpost of the still emerging Empire. There 
were psychic wounds, but they were individual, not the 
wounds of a culture profoundly damaged by violence. 
Turmoil had ripped through the world, uprooting and 
massacring tens, even hundreds of thousands, millions 
of people. In Rwanda, only a few years ago, over 
800,000 people were murdered in a genocidal rampage. 
But for Americans—for whom the world is always 
already media-ated—it was a distant, even unreal 
event. Who can tally the ultimate effects of a world 
where reality—and history is nothing if not reality—is 
viewed through a tube darkly? One result was a kind 
numbness that might be mistaken for confidence. That 
numbness is the absence of history.
Schools tend to present history in terms of dates 
and events. That’s how we learn it. An historian, I guess, 
would tell you that in North America we don’t think of 
history at all. If you asked most North Americans when 
the Magna Carta was signed or the dates of the English 
Civil Wars, or even, for that matter, when Washington 
crossed the Delaware, or more importantly, why he 
bothered (to get to the other side?), they’d be more 
likely to get angry than try to answer the questions. 
They don’t like being made to confront their ignorance. 
Newspapers have picked up on this sense of history. 
They present history in terms of school curricula, 
civics lessons, and province wide exams. They run 
quizzes with hundreds of questions about things that 
happened in the past, and people sit around their 
kitchen tables on Saturday morning circling answers to 
find out how much they know, or don’t know, about 
history. History is measured in terms the quanta of a 
world of the past. But as important as knowing those 
events may be (and I do think it’s important), that’s not 
really it. That’s not history. That’s the grease left on the 
plate after the meat is gone. 
That said, they can recall us to history. Most 
Europeans, surrounded by the remnants of the lives 
of those who preceded them, are recalled to history 
daily. It’s not that the Coliseum is history. It’s more 
It seems long ago, longer even than the last 
millennium, when the eager theorists of the post-cold 
war New World Order announced the end of history. 
That forever after the world would drift endlessly 
through the ever-accumulating wealth provided to the 
virtuous by beneficent free markets. That Americans 
(and eventually the rest of the globalized world) 
would troop to the polls millennia after millennia to 
elect (sometimes with the help of the Supreme Court) 
an eternal stream of indistinguishable Republicans 
and Democrats whose sole argument would be over 
how big the tax cuts should be. The end of history. 
Although they have since had second thoughts, the 
fact that they actually thought that history would 
end—that change—time itself—would simply stop, 
frozen forever on the particular reality of the United 
States in 1989, remains one of the great confirmations 
of Emerson’s observation that such “communities of 
opinion.,” as he put it, inevitably leave such “thinkers” 
“[wearing] one cut of face and figure, and [acquiring] 
by degrees the gentlest asinine expression.”
Strangely, as long as you didn’t look too closely, 
the assertion didn’t seem completely unreasonable. 
The only significant challenge to the modernity the U.S. 
embodied—a modernity based on free markets and 
the cultural and political institutions that developed 
over 400 years to protect and encourage them—had 
come from Marxism, another form of modernity. And 
Marxism had got its ass whipped. The Wall was down. 
Wall St. was up. The Soviet Union was un-united and 
Russia was scrambling to get on the go-go train. But 
even more importantly, the U.S. had come through the 
Cold War largely untouched by history. 
But then arguably the U.S. hadn’t been touched 
by history since some time around 1865. History is 
not exactly the right word here, but we don’t have 
another. Let’s say the intense, often destructive events 
which remind us of our relation to, our place within the 
processes and currents of the world. Wars had come 
and gone. American lives had been lost. But it always 
had happened somewhere else. The closest it ever got 
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If this in part is directed at his friends at Brook 
Farm, it also indicts a nation intoxicated with 
Christianity—no, an idea of Christianity—and 
an overwhelming belief in the apocalyptic destiny 
of another idea called democracy. “They acquire 
democratic manners,” he says, with the emphasis on 
manners, “they foam at the mouth, they hate and 
deny.”
History long ago gave way in the American 
popular imagination to what sometimes is referred to 
as “myth.” It’s not, of course. Among some of the others 
of civilization, the “uncivilized,” the “barbarians,” and 
even ourselves, once, myth is a mode of perception 
through which the world appears in a kind of terrific, 
godded and storied majesty. Now, the word myth as it 
is used in North America means the transformation of 
history into a secularized symbolic typology. Rooted in 
Puritan biblical exegesis, it is founded on the notion of 
a national character arising out of founding moments 
and persons that masquerade as history but in fact 
are symbolic types—the original marauding Anglo-
Saxon tribe saved from starvation by the Indians, 
George Washington telling the truth about cutting 
down the cherry tree, Thomas Jefferson penning 
the lines, all men are created equal. In each case, the 
actual complexity of whatever human event occurred is 
displaced by the compulsion toward the most didactic 
moralizing. Each and every moment in American 
“history” thus becomes charged with intense meaning 
as it symbolically informs the national psyche. Ask 
about King Philip’s War or Sally Hemmings, however, 
and you are likely met with a blank and/or angry stare. 
Because of that there is no such thing as a casual 
or merely functional gesture in American civic life. 
Everything must mean something in the national 
psychodrama. Thanksgiving can’t just be a fall holiday, 
as it is in most countries in the world which celebrate 
the harvest (in October—when it occurs). It has to 
be a Celebration of National Origins, or as my friend 
in Oklahoma suggests, a Celebration of National 
Whiteness. Thomas Jefferson can’t be just a really 
that walking past the Coliseum makes us remember 
the people whose lives were implicated in building and 
using such a structure and recalls us to the fact that 
we still are implicated in those events. Walking past 
Walmart, if it invokes thinking at all, only makes us 
wonder how much Coca-cola you can get for 5 bucks 
this week.
Those who proclaimed the end of history had more 
in mind than lists of past dates and events. They were 
after more than that, and more even than the patterns 
that historians since Thucydides have tried to discover 
and explain in terms of meaningful developments and 
concepts. The death of history was, on the surface 
supposed to be about the end of fundamental change, 
as if the culture and economy of the United States of 
America had achieved not just a high point in human 
endeavor, but The Pinnacle, beyond which the only new 
that would emerge would be kitchen gadgets or cloned 
organs. It meant the end of human agency and the 
absolute curtailing of the human imagination except 
for entrepreneurial undertakings within a neo-liberal 
economic order. 
But from the beginning America was above all a 
break with history, not so much its end as its denial 
or the forgetting of it. From the moment Christopher 
Colombus set eyes on what later was called Venezuela 
and saw it as the location of King Solomon’s mines, 
the place has always been tied up in the fantasies 
of another world. Emerson refers to the process as 
doubling or dividing. In “Experience” he proposes that 
“Life will be imaged, but cannot be divided or doubled.” 
He is working up to the conclusion of his essay at this 
point:
I know that the world I converse with in the city 
and in the farms, is not the world I think. I observe 
that difference and shall observe it. One day, I shall 
know the value and law of this discrepancy. But I 
have not found that much was gained by manipular 
attempts to realize the world of thought. Many eager 
persons successively make an experiment in this way, 
and make themselves ridiculous.
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Following Keats, Olson was after that tendency of 
those who use “history” as if it told a “true story” that 
not only ties up all the loose ends, but in the process, 
justifies any cruelty, any brutality that seemingly flows 
from it. As if our condition could be explained by 
reference to history as an answer. As if we could know 
it all. And as if everyone must be persuaded to accept 
that answer. Olson’s name for that was Thucidides, 
and its alternative he identified with Herodotus. The 
one told a single story, the other many, many stories 
collected from many, many people. 
For Olson, who always moved back toward the 
specificity of each life, that life itself was “the historical 
function,” an echo of Emerson’s proposal that there is 
no history, only biography. I take Olson (and Emerson) 
to mean that history is a living relation, not a chronicle 
of events or a particular narrative interpretation of 
them. It’s what we do, simply put, and it has no end, 
no determination other than what we bring to it, with 
guts, care, intelligence, and above all, imagination.
Every once in a while, history demands that 
Americans pay attention in spite of their cultural 
denial. The flaming collapse of the World Trade Centre 
was such a recent moment, and while it bore all the 
hallmarks of a celluloid event, it escaped that death 
in life at least momentarily by the actual havoc it 
unleashed. While two thousand lives are not much in a 
world where people armed only with machetes can kill 
800,000, or a wave can kill 250,000, it was still more 
than Americans are used to. It was “historic” in a way 
that, say, the Oklahoma bombing wasn’t. 
The Oklahoma City bombing killed 168 people, 
most of them either children or government 
employees, many of them black. Perhaps that lack of 
social oomph, combined with the fact that the building 
had no place in the national psyche (except to remind 
everyone briefly and guiltily of countless interminable 
queues) undermined any sense of history at work. It 
wasn’t that people weren’t shocked and saddened and 
outraged. It’s just that it never became “4/19.” The U.S. 
government did not declare war on anyone. The best 
smart, complicated guy with some character flaws who 
wrote heady Enlightenment philosophical-political 
texts and fooled around with (maybe even loved) his 
(“black”) sister-in-law (slave) after his wife, her half-
sister, died. He’s either a flawless, impeccably virtuous 
Founding Father, or a depraved, lying, hypocritical 
Simon Legree. Ain’t, as they say, no two ways about it 
in American “history.” Or, for that matter, any other 
aspect of American life. 
But if history is not lists of events or stories that 
organize them, what is it? The poet Charles Olson, in 
The Special View of History,  called history a function 
and a condition, a condition he named the penetralium 
after Keats, who derived it from architectural usage 
(the inner most recess of a building or shrine). It is then 
an awareness of and relation to what’s happening that 
locates us as part of what Olson called an intensity. The 
idea of an innerness here is not about hiddenness or 
something occult, but about that life which is ours if 
we grasp it where it rises within us to propel us into 
the world.  
For Keats, who was arguing about meaning 
and language and taking a little shot at Coleridge in 
passing, the penetralium came up in conjunction with 
the “Mystery.” Negative capability, he famously said, 
“is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, 
mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching 
after fact and reason—Coleridge, for instance, would 
let go by a fine isolated verisimilitude caught from 
the Penetralium of mystery, from being incapable of 
remaining content with half-knowledge.” Bringing in 
Keats, Olson went on to suggest that “[t]he rhyme is 
still ‘mystery,’” though he shifted the sense slightly 
with his lower case ‘m.’ 
By history I mean to know, to really know. The 
rhyme is still ‘mystery.’ We can’t stand it. Nothing must 
be left undone. We have to run up against the wall. 
There is nothing which happens to us which we don’t 
have the right to know what the — goes on. Even to 
know that one can’t know. Which is the hooker. 
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of War Information in the Roosevelt administration, 
charged with building support for the war among a 
reluctant population. Olson, believing that democracy, 
as a process, was worth fighting for, proposed to use 
the occasion of the war to renew that process among 
the American people. That is, he saw democracy not as 
a set of bureaucratic, organizational functions, much 
less as a “brand,” but as a historical intensity that arose 
from people fiercely engaged with making a particular 
world for themselves. It was not something you “got.” 
It was something you fought for over and over.
It’s not that what I’m calling “the idea of 
democracy”—democracy as a commodity, a brand to 
be bought, sold, exported—is without some virtues. 
A stable, relatively benign autocratic system in which 
those with enormous amounts of money allow others 
without money the right to choose which one of 
the rich will rule every four years (as democracy is 
currently constituted in the U.S.) has certain benefits, 
the most important being that it has so far prevented 
the outbreak of large scale political violence for over 
150 years. I, at least, think that’s a virtue. Others will 
disagree. But it’s not democracy, which presumably has 
to do with the education and mobilization of the people 
to actively, daily, participate in the governing of their 
collective civic condition. What happened to Olson 
was perhaps all too predictable. After producing one 
pamphlet, “Spanish Speaking Americans in the War: 
The Southwest,” he was shunted aside and replaced by 
Madison Avenue Guys with orders to sell democracy 
as a product, a commodity worth having and worth 
fighting for, whatever it was. Like Coca-Cola, Olson 
said. 
The historical opening the attack on the World 
Trade Center momentarily provided had a half life 
of less than a second. What could have been an 
opportunity to confront the complexities of history 
and the agency of Americans in relation to that, 
what could have been a chance to renew democracy, 
became instead the chance to further sell the “idea of 
democracy,” and especially the apocalyptic destiny of 
military in the world was not dispatched to Montana 
to take out various militia encampments. The militias 
that nurtured McVeigh and the radio/television 
commentators whose irresponsible, vicious rhetoric 
inflamed him continued unchallenged and unchanged 
without a single Guantanamo being created for them 
by Congress.
What was seen as historic, even in the midst of the 
demise of history, about the attack on the World Trade 
Center, remains elusive. Everyone knows it’s historic. 
No one is quite sure why, other than some vague sense 
it was an act of war. Perhaps that’s where the difference 
lies between Oklahoma City and Manhattan. McVeigh 
and his cohort thought they were committing an act of 
war (against the State), but everyone else thought they 
were a bunch of loonies. More importantly, they had 
names like McVeigh and Nichols. That’s not history. 
That’s criminal behaviour.
Ambrose Bierce once said that war was God’s 
way of teaching Americans geography. More sadly, 
it is also their connection to any sense of history as 
something outside remote text books. War is history. 
Some disaffected ex-GI white guys with a hard-on for 
the government in the name of the sanctity of the 
Constitution, however naughty they are, cannot, by 
definition, declare war on America. All they can do is 
break the law.
We only find ourselves at war when the attack 
on the government (which now strangely becomes 
identified with “our way of life”) is carried out by brown 
guys with a hard-on for the government in the name 
of Islam. Certainly in Olson’s sense, they understood 
themselves to be in history, to be acting with the 
intensity of history. And if in no other sense, it opened 
America to history at that moment. That may have 
been part of the shock of the moment, the sudden 
realization that history, in the intensity of those men, 
and the men who sent them, was not dead.
It could have gone any number of ways at that 
point. Olson, immersed in history, found himself 
during the Second World War, working at the Office 
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democracy, the idea of democracy as the end of history. 
Americans know what they believe, and have 
never allowed themselves to be confused by facts, 
especially when their sense of national virtue is at 
stake. Nearly three years after George W. Bush himself 
renounced his delusions about Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction, more Americans than ever continued to 
believe in them. People (or at least Americans) will 
fight for cheap Coca-cola, especially if it is somehow 
associated in a vague way with virtue, and the idea of 
democracy (cheap Coke for everyone!) is nothing if not 
reeking with virtue—something history never does. 
So rather than a sense of renewal and the opening 
of history, we are witness to the resuscitation of 
Truth in all its singular glory and the further evasion 
of history. E pluribus unum, it seems, is the current 
destiny of the United States just as manifest destiny 
once was. The unum, which historically expressed the 
intensity of the drive of diverse, alienated, colonial 
British subjects to forge a new nation out their unique, 
unprecedented experiences, has become the Imperial 
compulsion to protect themselves from diversity by 
converting the rest of the world to their Truth, much as 
Christian missionaries set out to do in the 18th and 19th 
centuries. That Truth now is the idea of democracy. No, 
not even the idea of democracy, but the “belief” in it, 
where the idea, such as it is, remains the stuff of vague 
sentiments and easily regulated functions.
